Abstract-In this note, we present a real-time model-free reconfiguration mechanism to achieve fault-tolerant control (FTC) and we show the feasibility of this technique with a simple hydraulic plant subject to actuators faults. The main feature of the reconfiguration technique is that it relies solely on the data generated by the actual plant and on the (control) specifications given by a performance functional. The resulting FTC system does not embed any on-line model-based fault detection and isolation (FDI) algorithms, and therefore such closed-loop system gets rid off the drawbacks of FDI-based fault-tolerant controllers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the several past years, fault-tolerant control (FTC) systems which have the ability to prevent faults from developing into a complete system failure have been the subject of intensive research; see e.g. [2] , [3] , [11] and the references therein. A fault is meant to designate a change in the characteristics of a system component such that the system does no longer satisfy its performance specifications. Typically, the way to make a controlled system tolerant to faults consists of two sequentially tasks: fault detection and isolation (FDI) where faults are detected/identified and controller reconfiguration (or redesign) to adjust the control law to the faulty modes. The controller reconfiguration is based on the information provided by the FDI system [5] which uses a model of the plant to detect any discrepancy between the fault-free plant and any of its faulty mode. An important requirement for FDI systems used in FTC is that the faults should be estimated with accuracy in real-time. If this is not the case, poor performance or lost of stability of the controlled system may result [7] . Another important issue is the time constraints, more precisely the limited amount of time available for fault detection/isolation and control systems redesign. Also, a critical issue which is seldom evoked in the literature is the strong dynamic interaction between the FDI and reconfiguration schemes. Indeed, in many published works, FDI and FTC systems are designed separately despite the fact that they will operate together. Furthermore, the issue of reconfiguring or switching the FDI system itself subsequent to a controller reconfiguration is usually eluded. These ignored interferences may certainly result in unpractical fault-tolerant closed-loop systems. In this paper, we present a real-time reconfiguration mechanism within a multi-controller structure [9] which selects the right controller to maintain acceptable level of performance subsequently to the occurrence of faults. The FTC approach taken here is based on a predesigned set of dynamic (possibly robust) control laws for the nominal and the likely faulty modes [8] . Note that such a pre-designed controllers set for FTC systems is highly desirable and even mandatory to enable extensive verification and validation needed for safety critical applications, as in aircraft control [4] , [10] . In a real-time classical FTC system, the right corrective controller is selected from that controllers set through the monitoring of the plant with a FDI logic which takes the role of an indicator of the operating faulty mode. So, what is really concerned by FTC is that as soon as the controllers are pre-designed, the problem consists in finding the real-time control input following the occurrence of a fault. Of course, this input (or control law) is selected by means of a FDI system, but could be done by, e.g., other plant modelbased methods. The idea behind the proposed reconfiguration approach in this note is to directly identify the right pairing "controller/faulty plant mode" with a real-time mechanism having the key feature that it makes no use of an online plant model and therefore does not experience the above mentioned drawbacks of fault-tolerant control systems made up of on-line model-based detection algorithm. A byproduct of the proposed model-free procedure is that the reconfiguration is fast and reliable. The theory behind the proposed approach is based on the mathematical framework of behavioral systems [12] , [15] , [17] and the unfalsified control technique initiated in [13] . The approach is illustrated with a two-tanks hydraulic process with some implementation considerations. This note is a continuation of the theoretical work initiated in [18] , [19] to which we refer for further details.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce the behavioral approach to system theory [12] , [15] , [16] and we state the real-time fault-tolerant control problem. From the behavioral perspective, a dynamical plant is merely a subset of timetrajectories, that is, a family of time signals taking on values in an appropriate signal space. The following gives a precise definition of the concept of dynamical system. Definition 1: A dynamical system Σ is a triple Σ = (T, S, B) where T is a subset of R, called the time axis, S a set called the signal space, and B a subset of S T called the behavior. (S T is the set of all S-valued time trajectories) The set S is the space in which the system time-signals take on their values and the behavior B ⊆ S T is a family of S-valued time trajectories.The elements of B are precisely the signals s : T → S which can occur and which are compatible with the laws governing the dynamical system Σ whilst those outside B cannot occur. A controller C for the plant G is a dynamical system Σ C = (T, S, B C ) acting on the same time axis T and the same signal space S as G. When the plant and the controller are connected, we denote the interconnected system by Σ G ∧ Σ C . In that case, the plant signals are constrained to obey the laws of both the plant and the controller. The behavior of the interconnection Σ G ∧ Σ C consists of those trajectories s : T → S that are compatible with the laws of Σ G and those of Σ C , i.e.,
The problem of controlling the plant G can be described as that of choosing a controller Σ C so as to impose that
where B J ⊆ S T is the set of signals constrained by the requirement on a performance functional J. The set B J is explicitly and usually given by B J = {s ∈ S : J(s) < γ} where γ is a real bound. The performance functional J is assumed to capture the control objective and examples of such functionals are the integrated absolute control error (IAE), plant output variance, peak value of plant output, etc... Note that in this framework, the control performance specification is simply viewed as a behavior, i.e., a set of constrained signals. From the behavior of the interconnected system (1), the following obvious proposition gives a simple condition for a controller to meet the control performance specification.
Proposition 2: A necessary and sufficient condition for the controller Σ C to implement a controlled system Σ G ∧Σ C which behaves as the desired dynamical system Σ J is
The equality of behaviors in the above proposition can be viewed as two inclusions of behaviors [14] :
The first inclusion states that the interconnected system contains the desired behavior (i.e., a liveness property), and the second inclusion refers to the fact that the interconnected system satisfies at least the control specifications. Now, consider the fault-tolerant control problem. If the plant is subject to faults, then the effect of a fault acting on that plant is that the behavior changes since new constraints should be satisfied by the signals in order to represent the faulty plant. For a fault f acting on the plant, the behavior becomes B G f and the control objective requirement (3) may no longer be satisfied by the current controller. To achieve fault tolerance, the control law should be changed in order to constrain the behavior of the faulty plant to the set B J , that is,
where C f is the new corrective control law. In order to be able to automatically tolerate and accommodate for faults in a given plant, a necessary preliminary step should provide a systematic examination of potential faults/failures, analyze the effects of each fault/failure on the plant operation and identify appropriate corrective actions. We assume that, at the outset, such an analysis has been performed and based on the identified faulty plant models, a finite set of corrective controllers
has been designed to accommodate the faults. The problem we aim to solve is how to effectively implement the faut-tolerant control system in real time without an online plant-model based FDI algorithm. Note that the preliminary systematic analysis reduces to determining, for the whole operation of the plant, an appropriate plant-model set for the faults on which a (off-line) design of a set of controllers is performed to satisfy the control objective as imposed by equation (3). With such a pre-designed set of corrective controllers (5), it is clear that a satisfactory performance will be obtained for some controller in that set when a fault occurs during plant operation.
III. REAL-TIME CONTROL RECONFIGURATION
From the considerations of section II, a natural structure of the fault-tolerant control system is that of a switching system in which a high-level controller, called the "supervisor" or the "reconfiguration mechanism (RM)", manages the switching of the controllers from the set (5), into feedback with the plant, so as to maintain the control objective despite the occurrence of faults. The structure of the FTC system is shown in figure  1 . The RM task is to decide when to change the control law and which controller should be switched into feedback with the evolving unknown plant. The task of deciding when to change an active controller is trivial from the observed data by computing the real-time performance functional of the closedloop system. However, when a change of controller is initiated, the task of selecting a new controller is less evident since no online model of the plant is used to determine the actual faulty mode. From the hypothesis of the existence of at least one corrective controller in the pre-designed set (5) for the faults occurring in the plant, a naive conceptual solution to the controller selection would be to experimentally evaluate each potential controller's performance by applying it to the plant. Unfortunately, the N potential controllers cannot be simultaneously tested in the feedback loop. To bypass this difficulty, we should be able to directly identify the right corrective controller to be switched into feedback using only the experimental information up to the current time. Therefore, the problem amounts to inferring the behavior of the feedback loop consisting of the unknown plant and a given controller from the observed data produced by the plant driven by a different controller. Using the notion of behavior introduced in section II and the concept of unfalsified control [13] , we show how such inference can be made. At this stage, it is worth noting that the set B G considers all signals which can occur as outcomes of the plant G , however only measurements from the experimental setting are available for actual running systems. These measurements give a partial knowledge about the system and might be thought as representing a somewhat small set of the behavior of the dynamical system. Let B G data be the subset of the plant behavior B G corresponding to the experimental observed data up to the current time. Clearly B G data (⊆ B G ) constitutes a partial knowledge through our observation of the running unknown plant up to the current time. With this known subset B G data , it is possible to verify if a potential controller C would have implemented a closed-loop system Σ G ∧ Σ C satisfying the performance goal through the test
If the test is affirmative at the current time, then controller C is said to be unfalsified by the experimental data B G data . This means that controller C met the performance objective if it had been connected to the plant up to the current time and therefore it should be provisionally retained in the loop until it is superseded (or falsified) by a better controller. Note that since B G data is not related to any particular experimental setting, the above test turns out to be a powerful tool to assess the performance of a potential controller even if this controller is not actually operating in the loop. To perform the controller falsification test, consider the standard two-degree-of-freedom controller structure of figure 2. The available data produced by the plant is its measured input/output signals (u (m) , y (m) ) up to the current time. The performance evaluation of a controller C k in the set (5) based on the measured data (u (m) , y (m) ) proceeds as follows. The full behavior of controller C k is given by the set Fig. 2 . Two-degree-of-freedom feedback structure so that, based on the measurements, the signal w should have been
where we have assumed that the feedforward component of the controller's transfer function has a causal inverse. Note that this assumption is not restrictive since the controllers can be designed to be bi-proper. The triple
T which is compatible with the behavior obtained by interconnecting controller C k to the unknown plant. Controller C k is unfalsified by the experimental data B G data produced by the unknown plant whenever
, that is when the value of the performance functional J at s k ∈ S T satisfies J (s k ) ≤ γ. Equation (8) defines a filter F k which reconstructs the reference signal w k from the measurements of (u, y). The above procedure can be applied to any controller in the set (5) of the N potential controllers, thus yielding N performance indexes
The unfalsified controllers are those controllers with index i such that J(s i ) < γ. It remains to select the right unfalsified controller to be switched in the loop. The control selection algorithm has input {J (
and output σ where σ is the switching signal, that is, a function from the time axis T to the controllers index set: σ = T → {1, 2, ...N }. To avoid arbitrary small switching times which can destabilize the overall system, it is necessary to impose a lower bound on the lenght of intervals between successive switches. This minimum lenght of time in which a controller is active in the loop, called the dwell time, can be fixed by collecting the measured data on time intervals [t n , t n + τ D ] of lenght τ D > 0. The logic is then realized through
with the updating rule
The switching logic enforces the following: it lets the stable dynamics of the closed-loop switched system have enough time to decay before a next possible switching occurs and it bounds the detection delay, i.e. the time elapsed from the occurence of a fault to the invalidation of the active controller. Note that a short detection delay requirement will need a short dwell-time τ D which clearly conflicts with the stability of the closed-loop switched system. The dwell-time should result from a tradeoff between the requirements on stability and the detection delay depending on the faults scenarios and their severity. Note that there exists a lower bound for τ D which ensures the stability of the overall switched system [9, Lemma 1.1]. The time for reconfiguration, i.e. the time needed after a controller invalidation to the selection of the next controller is however quasi-instantaneous needing only the computation time.
The explicit structure of the reconfiguration mechanism consists in a system of filters (8), a performance indices generator producing the indexes (9), and a control selection algorithm as depicted in figure 3 . Note that the system of filters (8) is Fig. 3 . Structure of the reconfiguration mechanism uniquely determined from the set of controllers. These filters reconstructs "virtual" reference signals as if the controller were in the loop. Then, using these virtual references and the plant input/output data, the performance generator computes the values of the inferred performance functional of each potential controller. Finally, the control selector implements controller switching into feedback through the algorithm (10),(11).
IV. APPLICATION TO A HYDRAULIC PLANT
The plant is a two-tanks system depicted in figure 4 and full details on its characteristics can be found in [6] . The technique developed in the previous section has been applied to the plant.
A. Description of the plant
The plant is composed of two interconnected tanks, two pumps that provide the flow rates Q 1 and Q 2 , two level sensors L 1 , L 2 , five flow-rate sensors for the measurements of Q 1 , Q 2 , Q F 1 , Q F 2 and Q 12 and three valves (see figure 4) . The control inputs to the plant are the voltages V pump1 , V pump2 applied to the pumps and the voltage V 12 for the throttling of the interconnection valve. The flows Q F 1 and Q F 2 are mixed through the valves located at the output of the tanks.
The main objective of the system is to keep the sum y 1 = Q F 1 + Q F 2 and the ratio y 2 = Q F 1 /Q F 2 of the output flowrates to desired set-points y * 1 and y * 2 .
B. Model of the plant
The system has two state variables which are the liquid levels L 1 and L 2 of the tanks. The equations describing the evolution of the states are The variables in the right-hand side of these state equations are given by the known nonlinear maps
and
where π 1 , π 2 and R 12 are nonlinear transformations which describe the characteristics of the pumps and the interconnection valve as a function of the corresponding input voltages. The parameters R 1 , R 2 are the throtlling of valves 1 and 2, and S 1 , S 2 are the section of tank 1 and tank 2 respectively (details on the model identification can be found in [6] . With the explicit expression of Q F 1 and Q F 2 , the controlled outputs of the system are given by
. Since these controlled outputs are required to follow the desired set-points y * 1 and y * 2 , these set-points can be rewritten as desired set-points L
C. Faults
The main hardware devices used for controlling and sensing the pilot plant, i.e. the two pumps, the interconnection valve and the two level sensors, can be affected by a fault. Different types of faults, such as bias, drift, power loss and stuck can be realized on these devices. For the purpose of illustrating the FTC technique of the previous section, we consider pump 2 subject to a power loss fault. Two faulty modes of the plant are considered: the nominal mode (no fault) and the "power loss of pump 2" mode with an effectiveness factor of 0.5. Note that stuck in actuators or faults on sensors, which require a detection and isolation of the faulty components and a change in the input/output channels of the plant, fall outside the scope of the supervisory FTC technique presented in this paper. Other methods developed elsewhere take care of such faults.
D. Design of the feedback controllers
The nominal fault-free system operating point is fixed at (L With the above consideration, the plant can be viewed as a multivariable system with two controlled inputs, and two sensed outputs. Since the control objective reduces to maintaining the levels of the two tanks at their set-point values for the two modes (fault-free mode and "pump 2 power loss" mode), the design of the corresponding controllers will be based on the linearization (16) . Two multivariable digital controllers, with sampling period h = 1s, are designed for the corresponding linearized plant models using the Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) synthesis method. Note that since the LQR method results in pure state-feedback, integral action will be added to the controller's structure in order to force the steady-state errors (to step inputs) tend to zero. The structure of the multivariable controllers is derived through the robust servomechanism approach [1] and proceeds as follows. The dynamics of the plant is augmented with the dynamics of the reference signals which are constant set-points here. Denoting the reference signals vector by w, the tracking error signal e = w − y has the dynamicṡ e = −Cξ (19) where ξ =ẋ. Setting μ =u, where u = u 1 u 2 , the augmented state equation of the system iṡ
B is the 2 × 2 submatrix of B v obtained from its first and second columns. It is easily verified that system (A, B) is controllable which implies that the composite system (20) is also controllable [1] . Hence, this system can be stabilized by a state feedback law
which, in terms of the original plant signals, is given by
where u 0 = u(0). Note that controller (22) has the structure of an integral (on the error) and state-feedback controller. In order to meet the requirement for constructing the filters (8), the feed-forward part of the controllers should be causally invertible. Therefore, we modify the structure (22) to a "Proportional+Integral" (on the error) structure by explicitly introducing a feed-forward matrix gain G ff .
Taking advantage of the fact that x = y, we set G ff = K 0 and end up with a multivariable PI control structure
We make use of this PI control structure for the two plant modes and compute the corresponding gains via the LQR method applied to the composite system (20). The design parameters are the weighting matrices Q and R of the per-
These weighting matrices are obtained after subsequent iterations to achieve an acceptable tradeoff between performance and control effort. Setting R equal to the 2-dimensional identity matrix for the two plant modes, satisfactory behaviors for the nominal operating point and for the "pump 2 power loss" mode are respectively obtained with 
where e (ς) 2 is the Euclidian norm of the control error vector. Note that this functional might not be necessary the same as the performance index used for the off-line design of the controllers. The tuning parameters of the supervisor are:
• the dwell time given by τ D = h for an integer , with t n the instants of possible switchings and h the sampling period of the feedback loop.
• The performance threshold γ. This threshold should be set in a way such that the two modes can be discriminated. figure 5 show that the real-time FTC system successfully reacts at time 2500s by switching to controller 2 (faulty mode controller). When the fault disappears and the actuator returns to its nominal behavior, we see that the reconfiguration mechanism switches on controller 1 at time 8640s. After an acceptable transient, the control objective is recovered as seen from the levels of the two tanks being equal to the set-points. Note that since the FTC scheme is based on control performance, when the active controller is invalidated by the operating plant data, the supervisor puts into feedback the best controller from the potential controllers set, that is the controller yielding optimal closed-loop performance in realtime.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this note, the development and a preliminary demonstration of a real-time control reconfiguration mechanism has been presented for fault-tolerant control. This reconfiguration mechanism have a number of highly desirable features. The real-time reconfiguration mechanism is model-free in the sense that no on-line plant-model for fault detection/isolation is needed. The mechanism is uniquely driven by the data generated by the operating plant and uses the control specifications to perform controller selection for the actual plant faulty mode. The achieved real-time control performance is directly used as a detector of unexpected changes or faults in the closedloop system. As a consequence, an important benefit of such a reconfiguration mechanism is that it rules out the use of unsatisfactory controllers in the feedback loop, it selects the right corrective controller for the actual faulty mode and gets the whole scheme to run quickly enough. This results in an enhanced reliability of the overall FTC system. Further studies and advantages/drawbacks compared to other real-time FTC approaches need to be performed before the concept can be considered to be proved.
